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Investigating Boundary Effects of Congestion Charging in a Single Bot-
tleneck Scenario
Abstract Many congestion charging projects charge traffic only within part of a day with predetermined con-
gestion tolls. Demand peaks have been witnessed just around the time when the charge jumps up or down. Such
peaks may not be desirable, in particular when the resulting peaks are much higher than available capacities or,
just before the toll rises up to a higher level, speeding up to get into the charging zone causes more incidents or,
just before the toll falls sharply, unnecessary slowing down or roadside parking decreases road traffic throughput.
We term these types of demand peaks boundary effects of congestion charging. This paper investigates the effects
in a bottleneck scenario with an aim to design charging schemes that can reduce undesired demand peaks. For this
purpose, we observe and analyse the boundary effects utilising a bottleneck model under three types of toll profiles
that are indicative of real profiles. The first type maintains a constant toll across the charging period, the second
type allows the toll to increase from zero to a given maximum level and then decrease back to zero and the third
type allows the toll to rise from zero to a given maximum level, remain at this level for a fixed period and then
fall down to zero. This investigation shows that all three types of toll profiles can produce greater boundary peak
demands than the bottleneck capacity. One contribution of this work is that, different from the work on designing
or optimising traffic congestion pricing schemes, we aim to analyse and overcome derived problems of the existing
congestion pricing schemes operating across the world by means of analytical techniques. The other contribution
is that, in order to reduce the undesired boundary effects of congestion charging a set of extra requirements is
proposed as supplement to the existing principles or requirements for design and implementation of congestion
charging. Concluding remarks are made on implications of this investigation for the improvement of the existing
congestion charging projects and for future research.
Key words: bottleneck models, congestion charging, boundary issues
1 Introduction
To mitigate urban traffic congestion from the demand side, since the 1970s a number of congestion
charging projects have been introduced and are now operating on a permanent basis around the world,
including projects in London, Singapore, Stockholm and Milan. These projects charge traffic only within
one or a few time periods during the day as opposed to time-varying and continuous 24-hour-a-day
charging schemes. Some only toll a fixed amount for the use of a charging zone or for passing through a
charging point during the charging period, such as in London and in Milan. Some set a different fixed
toll for each time interval of the charging period, such as in Singapore and in Stockholm. One reported
problem for such stepwise congestion charging schemes is that travellers tend to depart earlier or later
to avoid congestion charging or to pay less. For example, Fig 3.8 of the 6th Annual Impacts Monitoring
Report (Transport for London, 2008 Page 47) shows the traffic flow profiles throughout a charging day, in
which the peaks in inbound traffic appear around the start of the charging period and that in outbound
traffic appear just after the end of the charging period. In addition, either in Singapore or in Stockholm,
travellers tend to intentionally choose their times to pass through the boundary of the charging zone or
control points so that they can pay less. Hence, demand peaks have been observed just around the time
when the charge jumps up or down. These peaks are often caused by intentional traveler behavior (e.g.
speeding up or slowing down or waiting while they are close to the charging zone) so that they could
avoid congestion charging fees or pay less (Salmon 2010). Hence, such peaks may not be desirable, in
particular when (1) the demand during these peak periods are much higher than available capacities or
(2) speeding up causes more incidents or (3) unnecessary slowing down or roadside parking decreases
road traffic throughput. We term these types of demand peaks boundary effects of congestion charging.
By means of the methodology based on the kinematic wave model of traffic flow (e.g. Newell 1993;
Daganzo 1994, 1995b), this work investigates the boundary effects in a bottleneck scenario with the aim
to identify the characteristics of charging schemes that can reduce or remove these undesired boundary
demand peaks and to gain new insights into the real-life problem derived from the existing congestion
pricing projects.
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As the fundamental instrument to investigate the bottleneck congestion charging problem, bottleneck
models can be grouped into three categories. The first is the point-queue model, which is attributed to
Vickrey (1969) and often termed the Vickrey model. In such a model, traffic congestion takes a point-
queue form, i.e. cars queuing behind a capacitated bottleneck point without occupying any physical
space, which has been recognised to be a key limitation of bottleneck models of this kind. Due to its
elegant simplicity, it has subsequently been discussed or used widely in the literature, including Small
(1982), Arnott et al. (1990, 1993) and Braid (1989). But this approach is too simplified to investigate
boundary issues or many other practical issues in real-life traffic because it only captures a fraction of
the interactions in traffic flows. The second category of bottleneck models is to assume that the travel
time a traveller would experience traversing a road segment is a function of the departure rate at the
time when he or she enters the road segment and that there are no interactions between departure
flows at different times or that the outflow rate of a link is a function of the average density over the
whole link (Mahmassani and Herman, 1984). As pointed out in Newell (1988), “This model [proposed in
(Mahmassani and Herman, 1984)], in effect, admits an infinite wave velocity since any input flow has an
immediate influence on the output” and also violates the causality principle. Daganzo (1995a) shows that
this type of link travel time models can violate the first-in-first-out (FIFO) queueing principle. This type
of models was employed in dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) modelling at network level by applying
them to estimate the travel times on each link. Under certain conditions the FIFO principle can be
preserved (Friesz et al. 1993). Carey and Ge (2003, 2004, 2005) shows that, if this functional relation
preserves the FIFO queueing principle, it may be acceptable to apply it to a very short road section;
otherwise, it may produce an outflow profile quite different from one from the kinematic wave model of
traffic flow. In contrast to the above two categories of bottleneck models, Newell (1988) assumes “that
the highway is homogeneous and that the flow q(x, t) at location x at time t depends on the density
k(x, t) at the same location and time according to the theory proposed by Lighthill and Whitham (1955)
and Richards (1956)” (also known as the Lighthill- Whitham-Richards or LWR model). This approach
has been used commonly in the existing practice of DTA modelling (Lo and Szeto 2002; Szeto and Lo
2004; Friesz et al. 2011; Carey and Ge 2012; Ge and Zhou 2012). Different from Newell (1988), for the
facilitation of model solving these references use a discrete version of the theoretical model of traffic flow
that are proposed in Daganzo (1994, 1995b) rather than the characteristic-line based solution method
proposed in Newell (1993). The current paper treats a bottleneck as a real road segment or link with
a limited capacity and assumes that traffic propagates along the bottleneck following the LWR model,
which formulates a unique bottleneck model which consists of two parts. The downstream part is a link
with a limited capacity and the upstream part is a deterministic point-queue model at the entry of the
link; the deterministic queue exists only when the departure rate is greater than the receiving capacity
of the downstream part or the queue in the downstream road segment has grown upstream beyond the
entry of the link. We use the finite difference approximation technique developed in Daganzo (1995b) to
solve the LWR model numerically.
In the bottleneck scenario, we assume that all vehicles only go through the bottleneck once, hence
each vehicle is charged once only. It is also assumed that travellers have perfect information on traffic
conditions while choosing their departure-times with an aim to achieve the least generalised travel costs.
The generalised travel cost consists of travel time cost, schedule delay cost and congestion charging toll.
The total demand within the time horizon under study is assumed to be known and constant. It is also
assumed that traffic satisfies the flow conservation, causality and FIFO queueing principles. Further, we
consider a preferred arrival time window rather than a common work start time. These assumptions
enables a stable state of a bottleneck scenario to exist, at which all travellers receive identical generalised
travel costs.
The investigation in this paper is carried out under three types of illustrative toll profiles. The first
defines a constant toll across the charging period, which is termed coarse tolls in the literature (Xiao et
al. 2011, van den Berg 2014)). A typical example of this is the London Congestion Charging Scheme
(Transport for London, 2013) where a driver shall pay the charge of £10 on the day of travel if he or she is
driving within the charging zone between 07:00 and 18:00, Monday to Friday. The other typical example
is the congestion charging scheme in the northern Italian city of Milan where drivers currently pay a
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fixed amount of 5e to drive into the congestion charging zone (termed Area C) on weekdays between
7:30am and 7:30pm. So, in either of the two cities, drivers only need to pay a fixed amount of charge
once and then can drive in and out the charging zone within a day as many times as they want. The
Figure 1: Stairred toll profiles implemented in Stockholm (Swedish Transport Agency, 2013) and in
Singapore (Land Transport Authority, 2013)
second type of toll profiles allows the toll to increase linearly from zero to a maximum level and then
decrease linearly to zero (triangular). For the third type, the toll grows from zero up to a maximum
level, remain invariant for a period and then falls down to zero (trapezoidal). The second and third
types of toll profiles may be regarded as two abstract versions of the charging schemes implemented in
Stockholm2 and Singapore3. As shown in Fig. 1, in Stockholm and Singapore the tolls begin at zero and
returns to zero over a sub-period of a day and both cities charge the most in the two peak periods during
the day; the toll goes down to a non-zero level after the morning peak in Stockholm whereas it falls to
zero on Beach Road in Singapore. The scenario presented in this paper corresponds to the morning peak
period.
There are currently a good number of papers on coarse and staired toll profiles, which both are often
called step tolls. After a comparison of the two step-toll schemes respectively investigated in Arnott et
al. (1990) and Laih (1994), Linsey et al. (2012) proposes another scheme that allows drivers to “slow
down or stop just before reaching a tolling point, and wait until the toll is lowered from one step to the
next step.” The further investigation in this reference shows that each of the three charging schemes
is associated with a different optimal toll schedule, which compresses the total social cost to a different
degree and that such differences do not vanish as the number of steps goes to infinity. van den Berg (2012)
shows that, given variable demand, the more steps a toll profile has the more the users gain in terms
of social welfare. Given varied queueing models for commuters on congested travel-to-work routes, Laih
(2004) investigates the optimal single-step and double-step toll structures. It also models “commuter
behaviour where there is an optimal multi-step toll, with regular departure times and time switching
decisions.” Xiao et al. (2011) shows that the optimal coarse toll scheme is Pareto-improving while Xiao
et al. (2012) finds out that a coarse toll for managing the morning commuters may induce them to wait
tactically at the entry of the bottleneck, which means that the capacity is not utilised sufficiently during
certain periods.
There is also much literature that focuses on establishing a set of tolls to achieve a set of system
optimal or second-best congestion pricing tolls (e.g. Chu 1995; Doan et al. 2011; Tsekeris and Voss
2When a vehicle goes through a congestion tax control point, a time-dependent cost will have to be paid but the total
amount a vehicle pays a day is no more than SEK 60. Such a congestion tax is charged on Swedish-registered vehicles that
are driven into or out of central Stockholm, Mondays to Fridays during 06:30 – 18:30. The tax is not applicable on public
holidays, on a day preceding a public holiday or during the month of July.
3This toll profile in Fig. 1 applies to the control point on Beach Road (16).
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2009; Yang and Huang 1997, 2005; Zhang and Ge 2004) and utilising financial derivatives to facilitate
the implementation of congestion charging (Nie 2012; Teodorovic et al. 2008; Tian et al. 2013; Yang and
Wang 2011; Yao et al. 2010; Xiao et al. 2013). Differing from the work on designing or optimising traffic
congestion pricing schemes, one contribution of the current work is that we aim to analyse and overcome
derived problems of the existing congestion pricing schemes operating across the world by means of
analytical techniques, specifically, focusing on the undesired boundary effect problem arising from the
implementation and operations of congestion charging and seeking ways out for this. For this purpose,
this paper is interested in analysing the impacts of the aforementioned three toll profiles on departure
rate patterns. Following this section, Section 2 describes the bottleneck scenario and the methodology
used in this research. Section 3 presents and analyses demand peaks obtained numerically under the
aforementioned three types of toll profiles. Section 4 discusses and proposes a set of extra requirements
as supplement to the existing principles or requirements for design and implementation of congestion
charging, which aims specially to reduce the undesired boundary effects of congestion charging. Some
concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Bottleneck scenario and methodology
The bottleneck scenario under investigation is illustrated in Fig. 2 and D travellers/vehicles are assumed
Figure 2: A bottleneck scenario
to depart A for D in the time horizon [0, T ], where D is a constant. They all have to travel through a
bottleneck, i.e. link from B to C with a limited capacity of qmax and length equal to L. Hence, as the
demand increases there will be congestion in the bottleneck and the travel time through the bottleneck
depends on departure times and congestion states, denoted as τ(t, f ) or, if it does not cause any confusion,
τ , where t and f = {f(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} represent departure time and a departure rate pattern, respectively.
It is also assumed that no congestion takes place on the segment from A to B or from C to D, hence the
travel times for the two road segments are constant, denoted as tAB and tCD, respectively. Since travellers
are assumed to minimize their travel costs and tAB and tCD are constant, without loss of generality we
let both tAB and tCD be zero.
Here is a list of assumptions made for the following model formulation:
Assumption 1. Traffic follows the first-in-first-out (FIFO) and causality principles.
Assumption 2. All travellers have perfect information on traffic conditions.
Assumption 3. A traveller chooses to depart at a departure time that incurs the minimum generalised
cost.
2.1 Scenario settings
Charging period and Generalised travel costs. We consider a charging period [ts, te] ⊂ [0, T ] and let Ctoll(t)
be the toll (per vehicle) collected at the entry of the bottleneck or at the time a vehicle starts to queue,
whichever is earlier. Ctoll(t) satisfies the following condition
Ctoll(t) =
{
≥ 0, if t ∈ [ts, te]
0, otherwise
(1)
and the generalized travel cost a traveller would experience is given by
Cg(t, f) = ατ(t, f) + Cs(t+ τ) + Ctoll(t) (2)
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in which the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of Eq. (2) represents the travel time cost, the second
denotes the schedule delay cost and α is the monetary value per unit time.
Preferred arrival window and schedule delay costs. It is assumed that [wl, wr] is a preferred arrival
window. Suppose that a traveller arrives within the window and then (s)he will receive no schedule delay
costs; otherwise, due to early or late arrival at D, a penalty Cs(t+ τ) will be incurred, i.e. schedule delay
cost. We adopt the following widely used form of schedule delay costs in the literature (e.g. Hendrickson
and Kocur 1981, Braid 1989, Arnott et al. 1993):
Cs(t+ τ) =


β[wl − (t+ τ)], 0 ≤ t+ τ < wl
0, wl ≤ t+ τ < wr
γ[(t+ τ)− wr], wr ≤ t+ τ ≤ T
(3)
where β and γ respectively represent the shadow costs of early and late arrivals and satisfy β < α < γ.
Travel time generation. Here we use the kinematic wave model of traffic flow to describe the movement
of traffic through the bottleneck and a discretisation approximation to the model, i.e. finite difference
approximation (FDA) model (Daganzo, 1995b) is implemented. We obtain travel times τ by comparing
the cumulative traffic at the entry and exit of the bottleneck, represented by Q(t) and E(t), respectively.
Specifically, the travel time a traveller departing at time t would experience is equal to the horizontal gap
between the two N-curves: Q(t) and E(t) (see Ge and Carey 2004 and Long et al. 2012 for example).
The following quadratic flow-density (q-k) relationship is used in this research:
q =
{
(qmax − vfkc)( k
kc
)2 + vfk if 0 ≤ k ≤ kc
qmax
[
−k2+2kc(k−kj)+(kj)2
kc−kj
]
if kc < k ≤ kj
(4)
where qmax represents the capacity of the bottleneck, vf free-flow speed, kc critical density and kj jam
density. Additionally, it is required that kc = 2qmax/vf hold, which gives dq/dk = 0 at k = kc. Such a
q-k relationship is also used in (Lin and Ge, 2006; Carey and Ge, 2012; Ge and Zhou, 2012).
Feasible set of departure rate patterns. f(t) is subject to the flow conservation and non-negativity con-
straints, i.e. ∫ T
0
f(t)dt = D (5)
f(x) ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (6)
and we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: By letting y(t) =
∫ t
0 f(s)ds then the flow-conservation constraint (5) is equivalent to the
following two-point boundary value conditions:
y˙(t) = f(t) (7a)
y(0) = 0 (7b)
y(T ) = D (7c)
Remark 1: This is a simplified version of network-level two-point traffic dynamics presented at Friesz
et al. (2008, 2011). Hence, the proof of this proposition is omitted.
All flow patterns satisfying the constraints (6) – (7) compose a feasible set of f , denoted as
Λ = {f : Eqs (6)− (7) hold}.
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2.2 Methodology
Following the previously-defined notations, we define the equilibrium state of the bottleneck as follows:
Definition 1: Let µ = min{Cg(t, f) : ∀t ∈ [0, T ]} and a pattern f ∈ Λ is in equilibrium if
Cg(t, f) = µ if f(t) > 0 (8a)
Cg(t, f) ≥ 0 if f(t) = 0 (8b)
Remark 2: The equilibrium condition says that a traveller only leaves at a time which produces the
least travel costs µ.
When Cg(·, f) : [0, T ]→ R
+ is measurable on [0, T ] for each f , following Friesz et al. (1993, 2011) the
above equilibrium condition (8) can be reformulated as the variational inequality (VI) problem below:
Finding f∗ ∈ Λ such that ∫ T
0
[f(t)− f∗(t)]Cg(t, f
∗)dt ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ Λ (9)
The VI problems given in Friesz et al. (1993, 2011) are equivalent to a simultaneous route and departure
choice dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) problem and the above VI problem containing the departure
choice only can be regarded as a special case of the VI formulations presented in the two references.
For such formulations, Friesz and Mookherjee (2006) and Friesz et al. (2011) proposed a fixed-point
algorithm. Yang and Huang (1997) proposed an optimal control variable-demand bottleneck model,
which determines the optimal congestion pricing tolls as well as departure rate pattern. These methods
all require continuous travel times but this is not always the case in this piece of research work since the
coarse toll makes the generalised travel cost function discontinuous at least at both ends of the charging
period. To avoid the discontinuity issue, the following pairwise swapping method has been actually used
in our numerical experiments:
Step 0: Initialisation
Divide the time horizon [0, T ] into I intervals of length δ, indexed by i = 1, 2, .., I. Set the initial
departure rate pattern f0 by letting f0i = D/(Iδ), i = 1, 2, ..., I. Set the iteration number to
n = 0, the maximum number of iterations to N and the tolerance to ǫ0.
Step 1: Travel time and cost generation
Load traffic fn into the bottleneck, generate the travel times τi, i = 1, 2, ..., I, and then compute
the generalised travel costs as follows
Cnig = ατi + Ca(t+ τi) + C
i
toll,∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..., I
Step 2: T ime interval pairing and departure swapping
Ranking all Cnig in ascending order, i = 1, 2, ..., I gives
Cn1
′
g ≤ C
n2′
g ≤ · · · ≤ C
nI′
g .
Suppose that the time interval i′ is the first one with non-zero departure rate from the right side
of the above ordered travel costs. Pair the time intervals numbered from 1′ to i′ in the following
manner:
(1′, i′), (2′, (i− 1)′), · · · , (( i2 )
′, ( i2 + 1)
′) if i is even
(1′, i′), (2′, (i− 1)′), · · · , (( i−12 )
′, ( i−12 + 1)
′) if i is odd
For each pair, a certain proportion of traffic from the more expensive interval is transferred to
the cheaper one. Consider a pair (j′, k′) with travel costs Cnj
′
g < Cnk
′
g and swap a fraction hn
of the flow fnk′ from k
′ to j′ in the following manner:
fn+1j′ = f
n
j′ + hnf
n
k′ , f
n+1
k′ = f
n
k′ − hnf
n
k′ (10)
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where hn = αn
Cnk
′
g −C
nj′
g√
(Cnk′g )
2+(Cnj
′
g )2
and αn is a parameter that can vary at each iteration n and
should be chosen so that hn ≤ 1 and normally the simplest way to ensure this requirement is to
choose 0 < αn ≤ 1.
Step 3: Convergence test
If ǫ =
∑I
i=0 f
n+1
i (C
ni
g − C
n1′
g )
2 < ǫ0 or n > N , let f
∗ = fn+1 stop. Otherwise, n = n+ 1 and go
to Step 1.
Clearly, the swapping rule Eq. (10) ensures that traffic is always switched from the more costly time
interval to the less costly one and that no traffic switches between a pair of intervals if the generalised
travel costs corresponding to them are equal. Certainly, there are other forms of hn, as suggested in
Subsection 2.3 in Carey and Ge (2012). Also, fn+1 from Eq. (10) is feasible if fn is feasible, since
reallocating departure rates as defined in Eq. (10) ensures that
∑I
i=0 f
n+1
i =
∑I
i=0 f
n
i = D and that
fn+1i is nonnegative for all i = 1, 2, .., I.
Remark 3: This method equilibrates departure rates by swapping flows between each pair of time
intervals. A similar method is proposed in Carey and Ge (2012) to search for a route-choice DUE
solution by swapping flows between each pair of paths; as implied in this reference, the above method
may have other forms, for example we can remove departure rates from time intervals in proportion to
their deviation αn(C
nk′
g − C
n1′
g ) from the time interval with the minimum generalised travel cost and
reassign all of these removed departure rates to the time interval with the minimum generalised travel
cost. Mounce and Carey (2011) investigates the convergence of the path-oriented swapping method and
the speed of convergence.
2.3 An illustrative example
This example is intended to illustrate that the above pairwise swapping method can find the equilibrium
solution to the bottleneck problem. The scenario for this example is also to be used in the rest of the
paper.
The bottleneck of interest was chosen to be 5.25 kilometers or km long, i.e. L = 5.25 km with the
free-flow travel time being ttff = 7.50 minutes or min, hence the free-flow speed on the bottleneck road
segment is vf = L/ttff = 0.7 km/min. The other parameter values for the bottleneck were defined as
this: kc = 56 vehicles/km and k
j = 160 vehicles/km so that consequently qmax = 19.60 vehicles/min.
Additionally, N = 15, 000 iterations and α0 = 10
−6.
The time horizon under study was defined to be [0, 90] (in minutes), and the preferred arrival window
was [75, 85] (in minutes). The time step size utilised was 0.25 minutes, that is, the time horizon divided
into 360 intervals. A smaller time step size of 0.125 minutes was also tried, resulting in nearly the same
solution profiles as presented in this paper. The total demand was assumed to be 625 vehicles. Without
loss of generality, the value-of-time parameter value was set to 1, i.e. α = 1 monetary unit per minute.
In addition, β = β/α = 0.22 monetary unit per minute and γ = γ/α = 2.00 monetary unit per minute.
Fig. 3 displays the solution profiles of this example. It can be seen that there was a spike on the cost
profile in the vicinity of t = 80 but the departure rates during the period corresponding to this spike
are 0; hence the equilibrium condition (8) was not violated. The solution profiles of departure rates and
travel costs show that all travellers departed during [t1, t5], in which their generalised travel costs were
identical and equal to the minimal travel cost. Therefore, the equilibrium condition (8) has been satisfied
across the time horizon, which shows that the above pairwise swapping method successfully found the
equilibrium solution to this bottleneck problem.
As seen in Fig. 3(a), there were two sharp drops in equilibrium departure rates respectively at t3 and
t4. These were due to the acceleration fans, which arise when the downstream density is low and the
immediate upstream traffic starts to accelerate. Accordingly, the rates of change in travel times had a
rapid drop at t3 and t4; as shown in Fig. 3(b), the change rates become 0 from t3 and go negative from
t4. The gap between the profiles of travel times and generalised travel costs represents the penalties due
to the earlier or later arrival.
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(a) Departure and arrival rates
(b) Travel times and costs
Figure 3: Profiles of solutions to the example in Subsection 2.3
Fig. 3(a) also shows that the departure rates were greater than the capacity of the bottleneck road
segment between [t2, t3], hence a queue started to form at t2 and remained after t3, which shows the
necessity of implementing congestion charging. Fig. 4 gives the two cumulative flow curves N(t) re-
spectively at the entry and exit of the bottleneck road segment. It can be seen that the rate of outflow
does not always equal the bottleneck capacity and that, in such bottleneck settings, neither departure
nor arrival N-curves increase linearly, which differs from those results based on the point-queue model
(see Arnott et al. 1990, 1993; Lindsey 2010; Lindsey et al. 2012; van den Berg 2011; van den Berg and
Verhoef 2011 for example).
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Figure 4: Cumulative N-curves for the example in Subsection 2.3
3 Demand peaks under congestion charging
This section presents a series of observations on boundary issues under the three types of toll profiles
below.
C1toll(t) =
{
u t ∈ [ts, te]
0 otherwise
C2toll(t) =


u(t−ts)
tm−ts
t ∈ [ts, tm]
u(te−t)
te−tm
t ∈ [tm, te]
0 otherwise
C3toll(t) =


u(t−ts)
tl−ts
t ∈ [ts, tl]
u t ∈ [tl, tr]
u(te−t)
te−tr
t ∈ [tr, te]
0 otherwise
(11)
where the parameter u representing the toll level is a constant (in monetary unit). In our later exper-
iments, the toll level u is specified at three levels: low, medium and high, represented respectively by
u = 2, 4 and 6. As previously mentioned, the congestion charging schemes in London and in Milan are
typical examples of the first type of toll profiles while the second and third types of profiles may be
considered abstract versions of those toll profiles implemented in Singapore and in Stockholm.
The key reason of choosing the abstract other than real-life step toll profiles is that such continuous
charging profiles (with no sharp changes in congestion charging tolls) make it possible to find equilibrium
flow patterns or solutions (Ge et al. 2014). By the same token, our numerical experiments have actually
used the following continuous toll profile to approximate C1toll(t):
C1′toll(t) =


1+sin( t−t
s
δ
pi)
2 u t ∈ [t
s − δ2 , t
s + δ2 )
u t ∈ [ts + δ2 , t
e − δ2)
1+sin( t
e−t
δ
pi)
2 u t ∈ [t
e − δ2 , t
e + δ2 ]
0 otherwise
(12)
where the constant δ/2 is very small in comparison to the length of the charging period. This approx-
imation makes the toll profile at the start and end of the charging period [ts, te] not change suddenly
from 0 to u or from u to 0, hence smoothing out the discontinuities of toll profiles at both ends of the
9
charging period. Otherwise, there would be large fluctuations in resulting departure flow rates at both
ends of [ts, te] or no equilibrium solutions exist.
3.1 Impacts of choice of charging periods on boundary effects
The solution profiles of departure rates in Fig. 3 show that the departure rates in [t2, t3] ⊂ [50, 65] are
higher than the bottleneck capacity. To reduce the congestion in this period, a charging period wider
than this one was to be chosen. The first trial was [ts, te] = [45, 65] with u = 2 for all. Other parameter
values used are: δ = 2 for profile 1, tm = (ts + te)/2 = 55 for profile 2 and [tl, tr] = [52.5, 57.5] for profile
3. The solution profiles of departure rates and travel costs/times are given in Fig. 5.
As seen in Fig. 5(b), imposing the charge on traffic departing in the charging period [45, 65] made
many travellers depart before the start of the charge (i.e. t = 45), so there is a boundary demand peak
corresponding to each toll profile but none of them is higher than the bottleneck capacity; it should
be noted that the low toll level u = 2 was used. For each toll profile, there is a significant drop in
the resulting departure rates at t = 45; among all three solution profiles of departure rates, the drop
corresponding to toll profile 1 is the biggest, which results from the biggest rate of change in the toll at
or around t = 45.
(a) Toll profiles
(b) Departure rates
(c) Travel times and costs
Figure 5: Solution profiles for charging period choice
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It is interesting to see no significant change in departure rates after the charge end if full consideration
is given to the fact that the toll profile 1 did not fall down to 0 until te + δ/2 = 66. But just before
the end of the charge every of all three solution profiles of departure rates has a peak greater than the
bottleneck capacity and all of these peaks are higher than the original no-toll peak, which is not what
was expected before implementing this charging scheme. The primary reason could be that the charging
period was too small; specifically the stopping end of the period should have been set to a much later
moment. In the early stage of Singapore congestion charging, i.e. Area Licensing Scheme (ALS), the
charging period for the morning was initially set as from 7:30am to 9:30am daily. In order to control
the peak demand resulted from waiting to enter just after 9:30am, the charging period was, shortly after
opening, extended from 7:30am to 10:15am (Seik, 1997).
Based on the above observations, we extended the charging termination time from 65 to 75. We also
delayed the start of congestion charging by 5 time units. The changes in the start and stopping time of
charging have defined the second trial of the charging period, i.e. [50, 75]. But this “late-start” charging
led to the resulting demand peaks greater than the bottleneck capacity at the start end of the charging
period, which called for the extension of the charging period to an earlier start. So throughout the rest
of the experiments, we chose [45, 75] as the charging period.
We did not attempt to carry out a sensitivity analysis of the charging period but tended to show that
a wrong choice of charging period may make the situation worse. A final point to note in this subsection
is that the solution profiles of departure rates and travel costs in Figures 5(b)-5(c) show that the pairwise
swapping method can indeed find the equilibrium solutions even when such toll profiles as Profile 1 in
Fig. 5(a), and accordingly travel cost profiles, change very quickly at both ends of the charging period.
In the rest of the paper we will no longer present the solution profiles of travel times and travel costs and
that convergence does indeed occur may be assumed.
3.2 First type of toll profiles ([ts, te] = [45, 75], δ = 4)
As shown in Table 1, the higher the toll level the more travellers chose to depart before the charge started
or after it stopped. This is generally consistent with the original objective of traffic congestion charging
Table 1: Percentages of demand departing before and after the charging period
Toll level Pre-charging Post-charging In-between
No-toll 11.35% 2.72% 85.92%
u = 2 17.29% 3.66% 79.05%
u = 4 27.74% 4.59% 67.67%
u = 6 41.17% 5.57% 53.26%
— to spread the total travel demand, both spatially and temporally, so that the road capacity can be
utilized more efficiently.
To observe the boundary effects of congestion charging, look at the demand peaks of the solution
profiles in Fig. 6(b). At u = 2, the demand peaks at both ends of the charging period are lower than
the bottleneck capacity and the demand peak inside the charging period was also reduced. When u
increases to 4, the demand peaks at both ends of the charging period also increased and the demand
peak inside the charging period was further reduced although the resulting peak was still higher than
the bottleneck capacity. At this toll level, the demand peak at the start of the charge is slightly larger
than the bottleneck capacity for a very short period. When u continues to increase up to 6, the resulting
demand peak inside the charging period was lower than the capacity but the demand peaks at both ends
of the charging period were higher than the capacity. Hence, undesired boundary effects occurred.
This shows that an excessively high toll level can produce the boundary demand peaks higher than
the bottleneck capacity whereas a low toll level may not reduce congestion inside the charging period
sufficiently. This implies that the choice of toll levels is a critical issue in congestion charging design when
we use this type of toll profiles.
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(a) Toll profiles
(b) Departure rates
Figure 6: Solution profiles from the first type of toll profiles
Note that in Fig. 6(b) there is quite a long interval in which no traffic appeared at either u = 2 or
4, which made both time and road capacity unexpectedly under-utilized. This is not only due to the
excessively high toll level but also because of the sharp change in the toll. These observations suggest
that gradually changing toll profiles be a better choice than the flat toll profiles because we may be able
to reduce the boundary effects by lowering the tolls at both ends of the charging periods, as implemented
in Singapore and in Stockholm.
Fig. 7 displays the cumulative N-curves under the first type of toll profiles and we have to acknowledge
that it is not that intuitive to observe the boundary effects by means of such cumulative N-curves unless
a linear cumulative curve whose slope equals the bottleneck capacity is also drawn; that the slope of
an N-curve is greater than the bottleneck capacity at the time when the toll jumps up or down means
the appearance of undesired boundary effects. In addition, it is difficult to tell from this figure that
congestion charging has driven more traffic to depart after the charging period. These curves are widely
used in equilibrium analysis of the bottleneck scenario, though.
3.3 Second type of toll profiles ([ts, te] = [45, 75], tm = 60)
As shown in Table 2, under the type of toll profiles given in Fig. 8(a), the higher the toll level the more
travellers chose to depart before the charge started or after it stopped. However, when we focus on the
proportions of travel demand departing in the post-charging period we can see that the total departure
at u = 2 is even less than the no-toll case. This may be due to the congestion charging making traffic
less crowded inside the charging period and because the toll close to the end of the charging period was
low, travellers tended to depart before the charging ended rather than waiting outside the charging point
or cordon. This can be confirmed by the last peaks of the departure rate profiles in Fig. 8(b).
It is interesting to see that, as the toll increased from one level to another, more travellers departed
12
Figure 7: Cumulative N-curves for the first type of toll profiles
Table 2: Percentages of demand departing before and after the charging period
Toll level Pre-charging Post-charging In-between
No-toll 11.35% 2.72% 85.92%
u = 2 13.98% 2.50% 83.52%
u = 4 20.33% 2.77% 76.90%
u = 6 29.93% 2.98% 67.09%
before the charge started but there were no significant changes in the departure rates after the charge
stopped.
As shown in Fig. 8, when the charge started to grow linearly from 0 at t = 45, the departure rates
dropped quickly to a level below the bottleneck capacity; but as the toll started to decrease linearly at
t = 60, the departure rates increased quickly up to a level above the capacity. As the toll continues to
fall, the departure rates started to fluctuate and eventually dropped to a level below the capacity before
the end of the charging period. Some of these demand peaks under congestion charging were even higher
than the original demand peak associated with the no-toll case. The primary reason may be due to the
rapid fall in the toll. This shows that if a toll profile decreases too fast, the boundary issues may shift
from an end of the charge period to a point inside the period. Also, the resulting demand peak may be
higher than the original peak with no toll. There may be more than one demand peak because of the
fluctuations in departure rates when the toll profile falls.
It is interesting to see in Fig. 1 that the toll implemented in Singapore and associated with the morning
peak fell more slowly than it rose whereas the toll associated with the evening peak fell more quickly
than it rose. Again in Fig. 1, the toll implemented in Stockholm and associated with the morning peak
increases to a maximum level and then decreases but does not fall to zero; the toll stays at this non-zero
level; when the evening peak comes, the toll increases again up to a maximum level and then falls to zero.
Based on the numerical results above, it can be concluded that such toll profiles would help to reduce
the demand peaks inside and outside the charging period.
These experiments also show that an excessively high toll level can produce the boundary demand
peaks higher than the bottleneck capacity as the toll level of u = 6 produced a boundary demand peak
greater than the capacity at the start of the charge.
Analysing the N-curves in Fig. 9, we can clearly see that the arrival rate may be time-varying, given
the bottleneck scenario set up previously, which is different from the Vickrey or point-queue bottleneck
model whose arrival rate is constant and always equal to the bottleneck capacity.
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(a) Toll profiles
(b) Departure rates
Figure 8: Solution profiles from the second type of toll profiles
3.4 Third type of toll profiles ([ts, te] = [45, 75], tl = 55 and tr = 65)
The solution profiles under this type of toll profiles are given in Fig. 10, based on which a general point
can be made that the higher the toll level the more travelers chose to depart outside the charging period.
This is substantiated by the data in Table 3. As discussed previously, this point is also true to the other
Table 3: Percentages of demand departing before and after the charging period
Toll level Pre-charging Post-charging In-between
No-toll 11.35% 2.72% 85.92%
u = 2 15.40% 2.41% 82.19%
u = 4 23.53% 3.01% 73.47%
u = 6 37.75% 2.93% 59.32%
two types of toll profiles.
The second point consistent with the previous experiments is that there were demand peaks just
before the start of the charging but they dropped sharply once the charge started. Different from the
experiments on the flat toll (i.e. first type of toll profiles) but similar to the experiments on the second
type of toll profiles, the departure rates did not drop down to the zero but far above zero.
The third point shared by the experiments on all three types of toll profiles is that there were no
significant changes in departure rates after the termination of the charge.
Furthermore, as the largest of the three toll levels u = 6 produced a problematic solution profile of
departure rates. Firstly, the demand peaks were greater than the bottleneck capacity, both inside and
outside the charging period. Secondly, the departure rates stayed at zero for a while when the toll reached
the maximum, which results in the under-utilisation of time and road capacity resources. Thirdly, the
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Figure 9: Cumulative N-curves for the second type of toll profiles
demand peak before the charging end was much higher than the demand peak associated with the no-toll
case. The primary reason for this problematic solution profile of departure rates is an excessively high
toll level. This again shows that the choice of toll levels is of critical importance to the success of a
congestion charging project.
At u = 2 or 4, the demand peaks on either end of the charging period have been significantly reduced
and lower than the bottleneck capacity. In [63.5, 70.5], the departure rates associated with all three toll
levels are above the bottleneck capacity and the lower toll level the lower peak of departure rates. While
the toll was falling, the departure rates jumped to a level above the bottleneck capacity. Again, the
slower rate of decrease in the toll the lower demand peaks. In Subsection 3.3, we discussed briefly the toll
profiles given in Fig. 1, which helps to prevent too many people from delaying their trips and causing
undesired demand peaks.
We can also argue about this using the solution profiles associated with the second and third types of
toll profiles. For each toll level u, the RHS of toll profiles of the third type decreases much faster than
that of the second type and the resulting most-right demand peak from the third type of toll profile was
much higher than that from the second type.
Fig. 11 gives the cumulative N-curves under this type of toll profiles at three toll levels, which is
different from those based on the point-queue bottleneck model (Vickrey 1969; Zhang et al. 2013) but
looks like ones in Newell (1988).
3.5 Toll profile assessment
Whilst further examination of the charging sub-period choice is a requirement for our ongoing work, here
is a description of a preliminary assessment of the relative benefits of the charging schemes investigated
in the previous subsections. Fig. 12 shows the total travel times, total schedule delay costs and total
tolls collected under each of the toll levels (low/mid/high) for each toll profile considered previously.
As shown in this figure, all three types of toll profiles show the reductions in total travel times as the
tolls increased from 0 to 2 (low level) and to 4 (mid level). Whilst corresponding increases in the total
schedule delay may be observed, the ratio of the rate of change in total travel time to total schedule delay
is greater than 1, which indicates that increasing the toll to such levels is beneficial. The total travel
time increased when the toll level went up from 4 to 6 for the third type of toll profiles (trapezoidal), so
it would not be beneficial to increase tolls to this level under this type of toll profiles. For the first and
second toll profile types (fixed and triangular), the travel times continued to fall when the toll was raised
to the specified highest level, but the relative benefit of this change was reduced, the ratio of the rate of
change of total travel time to total schedule delay only being of the order of 0.3 (significantly less than
unity).
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(a) Toll profiles
(b) Departure rates
Figure 10: Solution profiles from the third type of toll profiles
4 Extra requirements on congestion pricing design
Having observed and analysed the undesired boundary effects of congestion charging, it is time for us
to consider the objectives of congestion pricing. The general aim of traffic congestion charging or travel
demand management is to spread all travel demand spatially and temporally so that the social cost
is minimized or social welfare is maximized. However, in designing a congestion charging scheme it
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get all precise data to compute real social costs or welfare,
which is due to market distortions, hidden information and hidden actions on users, etc. It is due to
these factors that only second-best congestion pricing tolls can be determined in real-life transportation
systems. The following set of criteria is proposed to make resulting toll profiles meet our needs and
generate less undesired side-effects:
a) The social cost should be minimized or social welfare maximized.
b) The resulting flows on the edge or boundary of the congestion charging zone(s) should not be
greater than the available capacities longer than a certain period.
c) No one tends to accelerate due to the avoidance of congestion charging tolls at the sacrifice of
traffic safety while closing the charging zone(s).
d) No one tends to slow down or sit outside the charging zone(s) to wait for the end of the charging
period.
e) The charging amount shall be transparent and also change from time to time at a reasonable
pace (e.g. monthly or quarterly) in response to emerging undesired boundary effects as well as changes
in travel demand levels, travel patterns, land use patterns, travel behaviour, etc.
An online note 4 lists Nobelist William S. Vickrey’s 12 principles for efficient congestion pricing and
4i) Victoria Transport Policy Institute (1992) “Principles of Efficient Congestion Pricing C William Vickrey,” Victoria
16
Figure 11: Cumulative N-curves for the third type of toll profiles
Figure 12: Total travel times,total schedule delay costs and total tolls
Hau (2005) summarises the existing criteria for a “good” road pricing system from the perspective of
operational requirements. It is noteworthy that the requirements we have proposed previously in this
paper are not contradictory but supplementary to these principles or criteria. The first one of Vickrey’s
principles suggests that “Charges should equal or exceed the marginal social cost of each trip.” In a
distorted market, it may not be able to find the right marginal social cost of each trip. To make a
compromise, we suggest minimising social costs or maximising social welfare, which is calculated on the
basis of current market prices. Although the same problem of market distortion exists, this optimisation
approach may be able to offer a set of tolls consistent with the objective (minimizing social cost or
maximizing social welfare). The second of Vickery’s principles is “Charges should vary in sufficiently small
increment to avoid creating mini-peaks.” He might have noticed from the practice of congestion charging
in Singapore that big sharp changes in tolls can cause “mini-peaks.” In September 1998, Singapore
took a bold step to upgrade their flat-toll-based area licensing scheme (ALS) congestion pricing system
to an electronic road pricing (ERP) system based on multi-step tolls, as shown in Fig. 1, which, it is
reported, has reduced the boundary effects or “mini-peaks.” Criteria b)–e) are proposed to specify how
to reduce the boundary effects. In the future research on overcoming the undesired boundary effects of
congestion charging, it is essential to take into account explicitly these constraints in an optimisation
model/formulation. The rest of the Vickrey’s principles can work together with the extra requirements
proposed above.
Hau (2005) categorises the existing criteria into three groups, which are listed respectively from the
view points of users, transport authority, and the society. The first set of four criteria is given for
Transport Policy Institute. Retrieved 2009-03-10.
ii) www.see.ed.ac.uk/ shs/Congestion%20charging/Vickrey.doc
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the sake of users, including user-friendliness (simplicity), transparency (via ex ante pricing), anonymity
(protection from invasion of privacy), and prepayment/postpayment option for charging. The subsequent
seven criteria have been given from the standpoint of transport authority, including enhanced efficiency
via direct charging, flexibility (responsiveness to demand), reliability, security and enforcement, provision
for occasional visitors, “market” price as an investment signal, and passage of revenue-cost test. The last
set of nine criteria is presented from the societal point of view, i.e. passage of benefit-cost test, minimum
of road work and environmental intrusion, provision for mixed traffic, handling of transitional phase,
compatibility with other systems, modularity to add-on options, tolerance to culture of non-compliance,
tolerance to varied geography, fairness and the availability of alternatives. It is noteworthy that none
of these 20 criteria are put forward to attack directly the undesired boundary effects of congestion
pricing. Our criteria e) can be associated with two of the 20 criteria, i.e. transparency and flexibility
(responsiveness to demand). It is well known that congestion pricing can influence traveller choices of
departure times as well as trip routes, the reason being their travel costs would increase if travellers
drive into a charging zone in the charging period. Only when they know how much to pay can they
make their best decision on such choices. Therefore, we need “transparency.” It is reasonable to say that
the existing flow forecast techniques may not be able to meet transparency if a real-time time-varying
congestion charging scheme is implemented, though. The second part of criterion e) calls to adapt
a congestion charging scheme to changed travel demand patterns, which requires a congestion pricing
system to be flexible to travel demand, which may evolve due to many factors, including implementation
or operation of congestion pricing.
5 Concluding remarks
In summary, the purpose of this paper is at least twofold. One is to highlight and investigate the boundary
effects of congestion charging and the other is to examine the implications of such effects for design and
implementation of congestion charging projects in the future. To fulfill the purpose, we did not use the
widely-used point-bottleneck/queue model but employed the bottleneck model proposed in Newell (1988)
that consists of two parts: one is a road segment with a limited capacity and the other is a deterministic
point-queue model at the entry of the segment, in which the queue exists only when the departure rate
is greater than the receiving capacity of the downstream bottleneck link.
A series of numerical experiments on the impacts of choice of charging periods on the boundary effects
of congestion charging have been carried out to show that a wrong choice of traffic congestion charging
periods may make the situation worse other than better off. The investigation of effects of toll levels
implies that an excessively high toll level can produce a boundary demand peak unacceptably higher than
the bottleneck capacity and could also reduce the departure rates inside the charging period to a level
that is so unexpectedly low that the time and road capacity resources could not be utilised efficiently.
Thirdly, we were aware of the rate of change, in particular the decrease rate, in the toll over the time. The
preliminary observations show that a slower rate of decrease in the toll produced a lower demand peak.
Finally, none of the toll profiles tested in this paper produced a departure rate profile entirely below the
bottleneck capacity across the time horizon. In addition, a possible reason for part of the peaks in the
departure rate profiles under investigation is the assumption of perfect knowledge on traffic conditions
and travellers’ values of travel and schedule delay times; in fact, a stochastic bottleneck model allowing
for user uncertainty shall reduce the severity of the departure time or rate peaks observed in the previous
experiments.
Our observations also imply that, under all aforementioned three types of toll profiles, the use of
congestion charging as the only transport management instrument may be unable to entirely get rid
of congestion (i.e. demand greater than the capacity), both inside and outside the charging period.
Therefore, it may be more efficient to implement a congestion charging project together with other
transport policy instruments, such as traveller information provision, improved public transport services
and other demand management tools. These are part of our ongoing research.
It has to be acknowledged that the nature of a constant toll being introduced at a precise time means
that under Assumptions 1-3 the flow effect on the network will necessarily be to produce a surge of inflow
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just prior to the charging period commencing and a dip in inflow just after (the effects being reversed at
the termination of the charging period). In practice, Assumption 2 (perfect information) will not hold
and Assumption 3 (cost minimisation) will only hold partially. It is then of importance to investigate
how the relaxation of these assumptions will affect the undesired boundary effects investigated in this
paper. Another hidden assumption that all travellers share the same set of values of time (i.e. α, β and
γ) may also affect boundary effects but they were not touched on in this paper since it is beyond the
intended scope of the study and the reader who is interested in this issue may refer to Ramadurai et al.
(2010), Tian et al. (2013), van den Berg (2014), to name a few. Whilst it may be hypothesised that
relaxing Assumptions 2 and 3 or taking account of heterogeneity in the travellers body would produce
less sharp path inflow fluctuations it is unlikely that such relaxations will mitigate these boundary effects
entirely; in fact, in the real-life traffic where these assumptions are not satisfied, such undesired boundary
effects of congestion charging have been recorded and discussed (e.g. TfL 2007, Salmon 2010). Therefore,
an efficient removal of the undesired boundary effects will still require a well-designed time-varying toll
profile, although the adverse effects reported in this paper are likely to be somewhat reduced under more
realistic assumptions.
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